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Abstract 
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1 Introduction
According to Alain Juppé, a former prime minister of France and mayor of the city of Bor-
deaux, “governments are too small to deal with the big problems and too big to deal with
the small problems” within today’s administrative limits. Bruce Katz, a vice president at the
Brookings Institution, went one step further when he said that “metro governance is almost
uniformly characterized by fragmentation and balkanization, by cultures of competition rather
than one of collaboration.” Empirical works confirm the idea that the institutional structure
of a metropolitan area has a significant impact on both the efficiency of its local public ser-
vices and on the welfare of its residents by influencing the distribution of jobs and the level of
housing and commuting costs (Glaeser and Kahn, 2001; Cheshire and Magrini, 2009). Since
metropolitan areas also produce a sizable and growing share of the wealth of nations, we may
safely conclude that there is a need for a sound economic analysis of those entities.1
The purpose of this paper is to study how the institutional design of the metropolitan
area affects its economic structure and performance. To this end, we develop a new model
with one central city and several suburban jurisdictions, in which the labor and land markets
interact with the tax competition between asymmetric jurisdictions to shape the metropolitan
area. The standard approach to jurisdiction/club formation is to focus on the trade-off between
the crowding effect of public services, which increases with jurisdiction size, and the unit cost
of public services, which decreases with population size. We contend that the problem may
be tackled from a different, but equally important, angle by recognizing that workplaces and
residences do not necessarily belong to the same jurisdiction. In practice, the central city
attracts a large number of workers who live in adjacent but independent areas, thus giving rise
to a substantial amount of “cross-border” commuting. So workers face a second trade-off. They
can earn a high wage in centrally located firms and bear high commuting costs. Or, they can
receive lower pay in firms located in secondary business centers and pay less for commuting.
By combining these two trade-offs within a unifying framework, we distinguish between the
administrative and economic limits of the central city, a distinction that has not attracted
much attention in the literature (Scotchmer, 2002; Epple and Nechyba, 2004).
Policy-makers stress the need for coordinating the actions of local governments. To seriously
assess the desirability and scope of such a move, we need to understand how local governments
interact with the urban labor and land markets. Since jurisdictions compete for tax revenue
to finance the public services provided to their residents, the institutional fragmentation of the
metropolitan area affects the location of firms and consumers. It is well documented empirically
1For example, the estimated GDP of the metropolitan area of Tokyo or New York in 2006 is similar to those
of Canada or Spain
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that a geographical concentration of firms raises the productivity of those firms through various
mechanisms, generically nicknamed “agglomeration economies” (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004;
Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). Despite this, another major trend is the decentralization of jobs
in secondary employment centers because land and labor are cheaper there (Glaeser and Kahn,
2004). In addition, the location of households also depends on the prices of land in different
places. Finally, since workers are free to commute, the distribution of jobs is endogenous and
determined together with the location of firms.
To carry out our study, we develop a full-fledged general equilibrium model in which con-
sumers and firms are free to choose their location within the metropolitan area, while local
governments act strategically. Our model, unlike those in the existing literature, encompasses
the effects mentioned above by combining building blocks borrowed from local public finance
and urban economics. Another distinctive feature of our model is that the central city has
better access to the metropolitan labor pool. As a result, the jurisdictions are asymmetric in a
way that differs from the standard modeling approaches used in the tax competition literature.
In addition, the structure of the metropolitan area can be mono- or polycentric, depending
on the parameters of the economy. For our purposes, a polycentric metropolitan area is more
relevant, with only a fraction of jobs located in the central city (Glaeser and Kahn, 2001).
Another feature is that our model can account for very different job distribution configura-
tions. For example, the employment level in the central city may be higher or lower than that
in the suburban districts. Yet, because the monocentric city model is still the dominant one
in urban economics, we also study the monocentric configuration as a limiting case. Lastly,
the framework we propose is versatile enough to study how a particular institutional context
interacts with market forces to determine the morphology and economic performance of the
metropolitan area.
Our main findings may be organized in three distinct, but complementary, categories.
1. We study the first-best outcome, which we use later on as a benchmark (Section 3).
The planner, who aims to maximize welfare within the whole metropolitan area, determine the
areas providing the public services and the employment centers by choosing where consumers
live and work. It is never desirable to amalgamate the suburban areas with the central one.
Moreover, the economic boundary of the central city always encompasses its administrative
boundary. This implies that the administrative and economic boundaries of the central city
do not coincide, a result that clashes with the general belief that these boundaries should be
the same (OECD, 2006). This is because the planner chooses the size of a supply area that
permits the best provision of public services, whereas the optimal size of central and secondary
business centers depends on the interplay between commuting and agglomeration economies.
In addition, whether the optimal metropolitan area is mono- or polycentric depends on several
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parameters. When commuting costs are low, agglomeration economies are strong, or the total
population is small, all jobs are located in the central business district. Otherwise, jobs are
shared between the central and suburban areas.
2. We then study the decentralized outcome when the number of independent jurisdictions
and their administrative boundaries are exogenously given (Section 4). There are three types of
players: a large number of consumers (formally, a continuum), a large number of firms (formally,
a continuum), and a finite number of local governments. Consumers choose a residence and a
workplace. Firms choose a location and the wages paid to their employees. Jurisdictions supply
public services. To finance them, local governments choose non-cooperatively a property tax
levied on their residents and a business tax paid by the firms located in their jurisdiction. Tax
competition yields a very contrasted pattern: the central city levies a higher business tax than
suburban governments.2 This is because consumers working in the central city need not reside
therein, which incentivizes the central city government to practice tax exporting. This result
shows the importance of working with a setting in which the commuting pattern is endogenous.
We also show that, under corporate tax competition, when the population size of the central
city is optimal, the central business district is too small, whereas the former is too large when
the size of the latter is optimal. Therefore, redrawing the border of the central city is not
the remedy to correct the misallocation of jobs within the metropolitan area. This tension
stems from the fact that the distribution of jobs is governed by a system of forces that overlaps
imperfectly with that taken into account by the local governments. As a consequence, there is no
reason to expect the two types of boundaries to coincide. It should be stressed, however, that the
misallocation of jobs is exacerbated when the relative population size of the central city is small.
Furthermore, although higher agglomeration economies, lower commuting costs, or both raise
the global efficiency of the metropolitan area, the gap between the optimal and equilibrium
central business districts grows. Thus, tax competition prevents public policy enhancing the
global productivity of the metropolitan area to produce their full impact.
3. Once it is recognized that suburbanites commuting to the central business district may
consume the public services supplied by the central city, the tax gap widens because the central
city sets an even higher tax rate to reduce the production costs borne by its residents (Section
5). All in all, the central city residents are hurt twice by the suburbanites’ free-riding behavior:
they end up bearing higher provision costs for their public services and earning lower wages.
This concurs with Katz for whom the culture of competition that prevails in many metropolitan
areas is damaging to the central city.
2Hoyt (1992) developed a setting in which the central city’s government influences the land rent in suburban
jurisdictions, whereas the tax policy of the government of a suburban jurisdiction has no impact on the central
city’s land rent because its population share is negligible. Like us, Hoyt showed that the property tax is higher
in the central city. However, unlike us, he treated households’ residential locations and workplaces as exogenous.
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Our analysis suggests that neither the amalgamation nor the decentralization among com-
peting jurisdictions is the best way to govern large metropolitan areas. Instead, combining a
multi-jurisdictional political system with an economic government of the metropolitan area or
a deep inter-jurisdictional cooperation seems to be a more efficient way to solve the various dis-
tortions inherent to the working of a metropolitan economy. In other words, our findings point
to the need for a common governance in a few well-defined domains, that is, tax policies. Such a
recommendation has been implemented in several European countries under the concrete form
of fiscal coordination (OECD, 2006). In the United States, the tax-base sharing program imple-
mented in Minneapolis-Saint Paul has decreased incentives for local governments to compete
for a larger tax base (Inman, 2009). As for the transportation policy, different institutional
systems prevail, ranging from the local to the federal government.
A last comment is in order. The legal environment in which metropolitan areas operate
vastly differs across countries. The model presented in this paper is context-free in that it
focuses on (some of) the fundamental characteristics common to most metropolitan areas and
disregards specific and idiosyncratic issues that are important in some countries but not in
others.
Related literature. Ever since Tiebout (1956), it is widely acknowledged that a wide
portfolio of local jurisdictions allows consumers to live in the locale supplying the tax/service
package that fits best their preferences. However, once it is recognized that the provision of
public services is often governed by increasing returns, political fragmentation may generate a
substantial waste of resources. Indeed, decentralization implies that similar public goods are
supplied in a large number of jurisdictions, and thus the fixed cost associated with the construc-
tion of public facilities is paid many times. This trade-off has been studied independently by
Cremer et al. (1985) and Alesina and Spolaore (1997) in different, but related, contexts. These
authors reach the same conclusion: there are too many jurisdictions and, therefore, excessive
public expenditures. Though relevant when consumers are immobile, this framework is not
suitable for studying metropolitan areas where consumers choose both where to live and where
to work, the importance of which is recognized in recent empirical works. For example, Rhode
and Strumpf (2003) showed that Tiebout mechanisms are not a dominant factor in the long-run
residential choices within the Boston Metropolitan Area, even though this metropolitan area
is often presented as the archetype of the Tiebout model. By contrast, the interaction between
land and labor markets is central to urban labor economics. However, this strand of literature
does not account for tax competition and its effect on the economic structure of large cities
(Zenou, 2009).
Only a handful of papers have studied the economic organization of a metropolitan area.
Hoyt (1991) and Noiset and Oakland (1995) did not account for the fact that jobs may be located
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outside the central city, while Braid (2002) disregarded tax competition. When consumers are
mobile, they live and work within the same jurisdiction in equilibrium (Braid, 1996; Epple and
Zelenitz, 1981). Perroni and Scharf (2001) studied the effects of capital tax competition when
the number of jurisdictions is endogenous and individuals are immobile. Braid (2010) focussed
on the distances between jurisdictions that choose to offer, or not to offer, a local public good
that may be consumed by non-residents. He did not study, however, the interactions between
the provision of public services and the labor and land markets.
The model is presented in the next section, whereas Section 3 describes the socially optimal
organization of the metropolitan area. In Section 4, we study the decentralized outcome, which
we compare to the optimum. We also determine the second-best outcome in which a planner
chooses the optimal administrative boundary of jurisdictions while local governments, firms and
residents pursue their own interest. In Section 5, we check the robustness of our main findings
when agglomeration economies vary with the distribution of firms, suburbanites working in
the central business district consume the public services provided by the central city, and the
central city supplies a broader array of public services than the suburban jurisdictions. Section
6 concludes with some policy recommendations and discusses possible extensions.
2 The Model
The metropolitan economy is endowed with L consumers/workers who are free to choose their
residential location and workplace. There are three consumption goods: (i) land, which is used
as a proxy for housing, (ii) a public good provided by local jurisdictions, and (iii) a homogeneous
good, the numéraire, produced by profit-maximizing firms whose locations are endogenous.
2.1 Jurisdictions and the provision of public goods
The metropolitan area (MA) is formed by m + 1 jurisdictions. It is endowed with a hub-
and-spoken transportation network, which means that the m ≥ 2 suburban jurisdictions are
connected only to the central city, which has a direct access to all suburbanites. Formally, the
MA is thus described by m one-dimensional half-lines sharing the same initial point x = 0.
Distances and locations are expressed by the same variable x measured from 0.
The central city hosts the central business district (CBD) of the MA at x = 0, while each
suburban jurisdiction may, or may not, accommodate a secondary business district (SBD). Our
model does not explain why the CBD is formed. Doing this would require introducing various
types of agglomeration economies that would make the formal analysis much more complex.
We have nothing new to add to what is known in this domain (Duranton and Puga, 2004).
However, the internal economic structure of the MA is endogenous. In particular, the CBD
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and SBD sizes are variable and determined at the equilibrium. Figure 1 provides a bird-eye
view of the MA.
Figure 1 about here
Consumers use a lot having the same fixed size. The units of land is chosen for this parameter
to be normalized to one. The assumption of a fixed lot size does not allow replicating the well-
documented fact that the population density is higher in the central city than in the suburbs.
It is widely used, however, in models involving an urban economics building block because it
captures the basic trade-off between long/short commutes and low/high land rents.
Although several of the results shown in Section 4 hold true in the case where the bound-
aries between the central city and the suburban jurisdictions are different, we assume that
the institutional setting is symmetric. Indeed, proving the existence of a (pure-strategy) Nash
equilibrium in a tax game often requires strong assumptions (Laussel and Le Breton, 1998;
Rothstein, 2007). In a symmetric MA, we are able to show the existence of a unique tax equi-
librium. In addition, using a symmetric setting vastly simplifies the comparison between the
equilibrium and social optimum. From now on, the central city is thus assumed to share the
same boundary b with each suburban jurisdiction, while all suburban jurisdictions have the
same outer limit B = L/m. Hereafter, we will distinguish between the boundary b and the
economic limit y of the central city, which is defined the boundary of the CBD labor pool.
As a result, the central city population (ℓ0) and a suburban jurisdiction population (ℓ) are,
respectively, given by
ℓ0 = mb ℓ = B − b
with ℓ0 +mℓ = L. This implies that the SBDs (if any) are symmetrically located around the
central city at a distance xs from the CBD.
Each jurisdiction has to supply a bundle of public services to its residents, which gives
them the same given utility level G across the MA (e.g. schools, daily care clinics, recreational
facilities). Assuming that G is the same across jurisdictions vastly simplifies the analytical
developments. We discuss in subsection 5.1 the case in which the central city supplies a wider
range of public services than the suburban jurisdictions. When the supplied population is
l = ℓ0, ℓ, the cost of providing these services is given by
C(l) = F +
c
2
l2
where F stands for a jurisdiction’s investment outlays and cl2/2 > 0 the variable production
cost, which increases with the population size l of the jurisdiction. This specification features
two characteristics that are frequently encountered in the provision of local public services: (i)
the need to build infrastructures having a minimum size and (ii) the congestible nature of these
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infrastructures, so that supplying a rising number of users requires growing expenditures.3 Only
the local residents use the public services supplied by their jurisdictions. In subsection 5.1, we
allow the cross-border commuters to consume the central city public services.
Each jurisdiction must balance its budget. This is achieved by allowing a jurisdiction to use
two instruments, that is, a property tax levied on the land rent prevailing in the jurisdiction
and a business tax paid by the firms located therein.
When a suburban jurisdiction accommodates a SBD, we call it an edge city to differentiate
it from the central city. In this case, the MA is polycentric; otherwise, it is monocentric. The
most interesting case to study involves edge cities since job decentralization appears to be a
powerful trend in many MAs.
2.2 Workers and land rents
The unit commuting cost τ > 0 borne by consumers is the same in both the central city and
the suburban jurisdictions, perhaps because transportation infrastructures are planned at the
level of the entire MA. Therefore, commuting costs are equal τx or τ |x− xs| according to the
location of her employment center. Each jurisdiction owns its land and the aggregate land rent
is evenly redistributed among the residents.4
Let y be the endogenous location of the individual indifferent between working in the CBD
or in any SBD. As will be seen below, a commuting pattern such that y < b is never an
equilibrium or a solution chosen by the planner. Consequently, only the following three patterns
may emerge: (i) when b < y < B, there are one CBD and m SBDs; (ii) when b < y = B,
there are no SBDs but m + 1 jurisdictions; and (iii) when b = y = B, there is a single city
and a single jurisdiction. Because of cross-border commuting, land is used on both sides of the
boundary between the central and suburban jurisdictions. As a result, there is not vacant land
within the MA.
When a consumer lives and works in the central city, her indirect utility is given by
V0(x) = w0 − (1 + t0)R0(x)− τx+G+
ALR0
ℓ0
(1)
where R0(x) is the land rent at a distance x from the CBD, while w0 is the wage paid by the
3In other words, we assume that the extra cost generated by a bigger population is reflected in the provision
cost of the public services. Alternatively, we could assume that the public services are congestible (G− cl) but
supplied at a zero marginal cost.
4Instead one could think of using the aggregate land rent to finance the local public good. The Henry
George Theorem holds when each jurisdiction reaches its optimal size. This condition can hardly be satisfied
here because the total population size and the number of jurisdictions are given. Furthermore, the land rent
capitalizes several effects in our setting.
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firms located in CBD, t0 the property tax levied by the central city government, while
ALR0 = m
 b
0
R0(x)dx
is the aggregate land rent in the central city. When a consumer lives in a suburban jurisdiction
and works in the central city, her indirect utility becomes
V s0 (x) = w0 − (1 + t)R(x)− τx+G+
ALR
ℓ
(2)
where R(x) and t are, respectively, the land rent and property tax in a suburban jurisdiction,
while
ALR =
 B
b
R(x)dx.
Last, when a consumer lives and works in a suburban jurisdiction, her indirect utility is
V s(x) = w − (1 + t)R(x)− τ |x− xs|+G+
ALR
ℓ
(3)
where w is the wage rate paid in a SBD.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the opportunity cost of land is zero. The land
rent at each location in the central city is as follows. Given V0(x), the equilibrium land rent in
the central city must solve ∂V0(x)/∂x = 0 or, equivalently, (1+ t0)R
′
0(x)+ τ = 0 whose solution
is
R0(x) = r0 −
τ
1 + t0
x (4)
where r0 is a constant that will be determined in 4.1.2 and t0 the property tax set in the central
city.
The land rent prevailing in a suburban jurisdiction is given by
R(x) = max {Φs0(x),Φ
s(x), 0} (5)
where Φs0(x) (Φ
s(x)) is the bid rent at x of a worker living in a suburban jurisdiction and
working in the central city (an edge city). Given V s0 (x) and V
s(x), the equilibrium land rent is
such as ∂V s0 (x)/∂x = ∂V
s(x)/∂x = 0. As a consequence, the bid rents are
Φs0(x) = r
s
0 −
τ
1 + t
x Φs(x) = rs −
τ
1 + t
|x− xs|
where both rs0 and r
s will be determined in subsection 4.1.2; t is the property tax set in a
suburban jurisdiction. Thus, in each jurisdiction, the slope and intercept of the land rent
profile are endogenous.
Note that the land rent redistributed to consumers is jurisdiction-specific. Assuming that the
total land rent within the MA is shared among all consumers is not consistent with the existence
of independent and competing jurisdictions. In addition, our assumption allows ignoring the
external effect stemming from the strategic manipulation of the metropolitan land rent by
jurisdictions.
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2.3 Firms and wages
Labor is the only production factor. Firms produce a homogeneous good, which is used as
the numéraire. However, our setting can easily been extended to the case of firms producing a
differentiated good under monopolistic competition. Note also that the numéraire can be used
to import other goods produced in other specialized cities, as in Henderson (1974).
A firm requires a fixed amount of labor, and thus operates under increasing returns. We
choose the unit of labor for the fixed requirement to be equal to 1. For simplicity, the marginal
requirement is normalized to zero. By implication, the total number of firms established in the
MA is finite and given by L. Firms can locate either in the CBD or in one of the edge cities
where they form a SBD.
According to Baum-Snow (2012), agglomeration economies arise mainly within the central
city, whereas Glaeser and Kahn (2004) argue that, due to the development of new information
and communication technologies, their scope has spread within the MA. Hence, all firms located
in a MA benefit from agglomeration economies, but they do so with different levels of intensity.
Ideally, agglomeration economies should be modelled by assuming that the fixed requirement
of labor needed to start a business decreases with the number of firms located in its vicinity.
Following such an approach renders the analysis of the tax game intractable. This is why we
consider a much simpler modelling strategy, that is, a firm locating in the CBD benefits from
a more efficient environment that takes the concrete form of a cost drop E. We may then
interpret E as follows: the stronger the agglomeration economies in the central city, the higher
value of E. Admittedly, this specification is very ad hoc. Our line of defense is that it captures
some of the main impacts of agglomeration economies, while keeping the formal analysis simple.
In subsection 5.2, we consider a more general setting that captures endogenous agglomeration
economies as well as spillovers between the CBD and the SBDs, and show that our main results
are unaffected.
Let Π0 (Π) be the profits earned by a firm set up in the central city (an edge city). A firm
located in the CBD earns net profits equal to
Π0 = I − (w0 − E)− T0 (6)
where I denotes the firm’s revenue, while (w0 − E) is the fixed production cost borne in the
CBD.
Because our setting is symmetric, all suburban jurisdictions charge the same business tax
rate T and SBD-firms pay the same wage w. Thus, when a firm sets up in an edge city, its
profit function becomes:
Π = I − w − T. (7)
In each employment center, the equilibrium wages are determined by a bidding process
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in which firms compete for workers by offering them higher wages until no firm earn positive
profits. As a result, a firm’s revenue net of tax is equal to its wage bill. Setting (6) and (7)
equal to zero and solving, respectively, for w0 and w, we get
w0 = I + E − T0 w = I − T. (8)
Hence, business taxes alleviate residents’ tax burden but they also reduce the wages earned
by workers. When consumers work and live within the same jurisdiction, both effects are washed
out. This is no longer true, however, when they work and live in different jurisdictions. As a
consequence, the property tax paid in the jurisdiction where the consumer lives and the business
tax paid in the jurisdiction where she works affect her utility level, whence her residence and
workplace. By implication, both types of taxes affect the equilibrium pattern of activities.
Because the shipping costs of the consumption good within the MA are much lower than
workers’ commuting costs, a firm’s revenue I is assumed to be independent of its location. How
the equilibrium value of I is determined is thus immaterial for our analysis because I does not
enter the profit/utility differentials that drive workers’ and firms’ locational choices.
3 The Optimal Metropolitan Area
In this section, we assume that a social planner maximizes total welfare in the MA by choosing
the size and number of areas supplying public services as well as consumers’ and firms’ locations,
hence the commuting pattern. In doing so, the planner faces the same trade-offs as the market
and the local governments: (i) to centralize (decentralize) the provision of publics services with
the aim of minimizing investment costs (operating costs) and (ii) to concentrate firms and jobs
in the CBD (disperse firms and jobs through the CBD and SBDs) with the aim of maximizing
agglomeration economies (minimizing commuting costs). What we call here the supply areas,
the boundaries of which are chosen by the planner, are not to be confused with the political
jurisdictions that are independent entities competing to attract firms and consumers within
exogenously given boundaries. However, although the jurisdictions’ areas will be given in the
sections where we study the decentralized outcome, they will play a role similar to that of the
supply areas.
Owing to symmetry, b, y and B are the same along each spoken. There are three types of
commuting patterns: (i) a consumer lives and works in the central city; (ii) a consumer lives in
a suburban supply area but works in the central city; and (iii) a consumer resides and works
in the same suburban supply area.
Individual utilities being linear, the total welfare WT within the MA may be defined by the
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total surplus:
WT = m
B
0
Gdx+ PE − CC − PC (9)
which involves (i) the productive efficiency gains generated by the clustering of firms in the
CBD:
PE = myE
where y is the location of the individual indifferent between working in the CBD or a SBD; (ii)
the commuting costs borne by the individuals working in the CBD or in the SBDs:
CC = m
y
0
τxdx+m
B
y
τ
x− B + y2
 dx = mτ

y2
2
+

B − y
2
2
where the planner chooses to locate the SBD at the middle point xs = (B+y)/2 of the segment
[y,B] because E is independent of distance to the CBD; and (iii) the cost of providing the
various public services in all jurisdictions:
PC = (m+ 1)F +
c
2
ℓ20 +m
c
2
ℓ2.
3.1 The optimal size of supply areas and labor pools
Assume that the number m + 1 of supply areas is given. By choosing the boundary b of
the central city, the planner determines the population size in each supply area. Evidently,
a marginal expansion of the central city (a higher b) reduces the number of residents in all
suburban supply areas. As a consequence, the cost of public services decreases therein, whereas
it rises in the central city.
Differentiating WT with respect to b yields
b¯ =
B
m+ 1
< B. (10)
Thus, regardless of the values of L and m it is always optimal to decentralize the provision
of public services into m+1 supply areas. The optimal size of a suburban supply area is equal
to
ℓ¯ = B − b¯ =
L
m+ 1
> 0
while the optimal size of the central city is equal to ℓ¯ = mb¯. Thus, the central city and the
suburban supply areas have the same population size. As a result, production costs in public
services are equalized across all supply areas. Note also that, at the optimum, the total number
of suburbanites exceeds the number of the central city residents.
Furthermore, by choosing y, the planner determines the size of the CBD (my) and that
of each SBD (B − y). Total commuting costs CC reach their lowest value when the average
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traveled distance is minimized, i.e. y = B/3 ≥ b¯. The productive efficiency of the MA is
maximized when all firms are located in the CBD, i.e. y = B. Because y does not affect directly
the production cost of the public services, the optimal economic boundary of the central city
is the outcome of the trade-off between commuting costs and agglomeration economies. By
implication, the optimal value of y must belong to the interval (B/3, B).
DifferentiatingW with respect to y, we obtain the optimal economic boundary of the central
city:
y¯ =
B
3
+
2E
3τ
(11)
where y¯ > b¯ whenm > 2 and y¯ = b¯ when m = 2. As a consequence, the CBD labor pool always
encompasses the central city, while the SDBs are located in the suburban supply areas. Even
when there is no agglomeration externality (E = 0), y¯ > b¯ when m > 2. Indeed, the central
position of the CBD in the transportation network makes the cross-border commuting socially
desirable. As the intensity of agglomeration economies rises (E), the level of commuting costs
decreases (τ), or both, the CBD grows at the expense of the SBDs. Likewise, when the total
population of the MA gets larger, the labor pool of both types of cities expands; however, the
employment share of the CBD decreases.
It remains to check under which condition the MA is polycentric (y¯ < B). This is so if and
only if
E < τB. (12)
In this event, the optimal MA involves m + 1 local labor markets. Thus, high commuting
costs, low agglomeration economies, or both generate the decentralization of jobs. In the same
vein, because B = L/m, a population hike fosters the emergence of SBDs.
In addition, the size of the CBD is equal to
my¯ =
L
3
+
2mE
3τ
(13)
which exceeds the size of a SBD. Put differently, the CBD is always larger than a SBD. However,
the CBD employment level need not exceed the total number of suburban jobs. Indeed, the
former is greater than the latter if and only if E > τB/4. As a result, when τB/4 < E < τB,
the MA is polycentric, even though the CBD captures the majority of jobs.
If the condition (12) does not hold, agglomeration economies are too strong, commuting
costs are too small, or both for SBDs to emerge: y¯ = B. Under these circumstances, the
agglomeration of firms and jobs in the CBD, whence a monocentric MA, is socially desirable.
Interestingly, the labor market is integrated though the supply of public services is decentralized
within the MA. In other words, at the social optimum, the decentralization of public services
within the MA and the agglomeration of firms and jobs in the CBD do not necessarily conflict.
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3.2 The optimal number of supply areas
The planner may also choose the degree of decentralization in the provision of public services
through the variable m. Since L = mB, choosing m amounts to choosing the spatial extent of
the MA. Two cases must be distinguished. In the first one, it is optimal to concentrate firms
and jobs in the CBD. Differentiating WT with respect to m at b¯ and y¯ leads to the following
equilibrium condition:
τL2
2m2
+
c
2

L
m+ 1
2
− F = 0 (14)
which does not have a simple analytical solution for the optimal number m¯ of jurisdictions.
Note that (14) includes the standard trade-off between the fixed cost of a supply area and the
cost saved on the incumbent supply areas when a new supply area is added to the MA. And
indeed, dm¯/dF < 0 and dm¯/dc > 0. It is also readily verified that dm¯/dτ > 0 and dm¯/dL > 0.
Lower commuting costs, a less populated MA, or both lead to a smaller number of suburban
supply areas. As a consequence, the optimal structure of the MA is governed by the trade-off
between commuting costs and the cost of providing public services. In particular, if F is high
(low), the planner provides the public services by means of a small (large) number of supply
areas.
In the second case, it is optimal to break up the MA into several employment centers. The
optimal value of m is now implicitly given by
τL2
6m2
+
E2
3τ
+
c
2

L
m+ 1
2
− F = 0
which, unlike (14), depends on the level E of agglomeration economies because not all firms
are located at the CBD.
The impact of L, F and c is the same as in the first case. However, lowering the unit
commuting cost τ now has an ambiguous impact on the optimal number of supply areas.
Indeed, two opposing effects are at work. On the one hand, for a given y, decreasing the unit
commuting cost reduces the total level of commuting costs within the MA. This incentivizes the
planner to select a smaller value for m¯ because this reduces total investment outlays. On the
other hand, since y increases when the unit commuting cost falls, m¯ should increase to reduce
total commuting costs. The former effect dominates the latter one when E is sufficiently low.
Proposition 1 comprises a summary.
Proposition 1 Consider a central planner maximizing total welfare within the metropolitan
area. Then, unless increasing returns in producing public services are very strong, the optimal
metropolitan area involves several suburban areas supplying public services as well cross-border
commuting from the suburban areas to the central city.
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Thus, when increasing returns in producing public services are not too strong (F is not too
high), the “fragmentation” of the MA into several suburban areas supplying each the public
services need not be wasteful. Likewise, cross-border commuting from the suburbs to the central
city is not evidence of a suboptimal political organization of the MA.
4 Tax Competition and the Metro Structure
We now consider a decentralized tax setting in which the institutional environment, i.e. the
number of suburban jurisdictions (m) and the administrative boundary (b) between these juris-
dictions and the central city are given. Our purpose is to find how the institutional parameters
b and m, as well as the main economic parameters, affect the tax policies and the location of
firms and jobs.
The spatial structure of the MA implies that competition among jurisdictions is strategic:
each suburban jurisdiction competes directly with the central city only whereas the central city
competes with every suburban jurisdiction. The interactions between local governments and
market forces are described by a three-stage game that blends atomic and non-atomic players.
There are three groups of players: a continuum of consumers, a continuum of firms, and m+1
local governments. Consumers choose where to live and where to work; firms choose where to
locate and the wage to pay to their employees; and local governments choose a business tax and
a property tax. In the first stage, consumers are free to choose the jurisdiction they want to join
and their location therein, anticipating the property tax they will pay and the wage they will
earn. Therefore, in equilibrium consumers will reach the same utility level. In the second stage,
the population in all jurisdictions has already been determined, so that local governments can
choose simultaneously and non-cooperatively a business tax and a property tax to maximize
the total welfare of their residents. Last, firms choose their profit-maximizing locations and
consumers their workplace, while land and labor markets clear. The locations of the SBDs are
determined when firms choose their locations in this third stage.
Once consumers are mobile, the specification of governments’ objective is known to be a
controversial issue (Scotchmer, 2002; Cremer and Pestieau, 2004). Our three-stage game obvi-
ates this difficulty because governments know who their residents are, and thus may determine
the total welfare to maximize. Moreover, the relationship between jobs and people having often
the nature of an “egg-and-chicken” problem, firms choose their locations and consumers their
workplaces simultaneously.
We seek a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. As usual, the game is solved by backward
induction. Because characterizing the equilibria of all subgames is long and tedious, we find it
convenient to restrict ourselves to the equilibrium path. In particular, consumers being mobile
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and identical, they anticipate that they reach the same (indirect) utility level V ∗ at the end of
the game. Thus, we have V ∗ = V0(x) for 0 ≤ x ≤ b, V
∗ = V s0 (x) for b < x ≤ y, and V
∗ = V s(x)
for y < x ≤ B. We call y the economic boundary of the central city, which is defined as the
limit of the area that includes all the individuals working in the CBD.
The socially optimal MA being symmetric, we find it reasonable to focus on a symmetric
equilibrium: Ti = T and ti = t for i = 1, ...m. In this event, wages paid in the SBDs are the
same: wi = w for i = 1, ...,m. Since there is no vacant land, we have B = L/m. Since wi = w,
it must be that yi = y. Note, finally, that using a symmetric outcome vastly simplifies the
comparison between the equilibrium and social optimum.
4.1 Labor and land market equilibrium
In the third stage, firms and consumers observe the tax rates chosen by the local governments.
Then, firms select a location as well as the wage they pay while consumers choose their working
places. Because consumers are mobile, they accurately anticipate in the first stage that the
equilibrium land rent equalizes utility across mobile individuals.
4.1.1 Job location
Wages being given by (8), it remains to determine the distribution of jobs within the MA. For
this, we must find the location y of the marginal worker, which is the same along all rays. We
assume throughout this section that y exceeds b and determine the conditions for this to hold
in equilibrium. As in the foregoing, the location of the SBD (xs) is the middle point of the
segment connecting y and B:
xs = y +
B − y
2
. (15)
The worker at y is indifferent between the CBD or the SBD if and only if V s0 (y) = V
s(y)
or, equivalently,
w0 − w = τy − τ (x
s − y) = τ
3y −B
2
. (16)
In other words, CBD- and SBD-workers do not earn the same wage and the difference
between wages must compensate the marginal worker for the difference in commuting costs
along any ray. Plugging (8) and (15) into (16), we obtain the equilibrium economic boundary
of the central city:
y∗(T0, T ) =
B
3
+
2[E − (T0 − T )]
3τ
(17)
which generally differs from the administrative boundary b. Evidently, the economic boundary
expands (shrinks) with T (T0) because the central city becomes relatively more (less) attractive.
Moreover, stronger agglomeration economies yield a bigger CBD while lowering commuting
costs have the same effect if and only if E is greater than T0 − T , that is, the wage paid in the
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CBD exceeds that paid in an edge city. At this condition also, my∗ increases with m. In this
case, a more fragmented MA has smaller SBDs.
Furthermore, the equilibrium shares of firms located in the CBD and in a SBD are, respec-
tively, given by
θ0 =
my∗
L
θ =
B − y∗
L
. (18)
4.1.2 Land rent
We now turn to the determination of the equilibrium land rents. Since all the tax rates are
given, (1) and (8) imply that the (indirect) utility of a consumer residing in the central city is
given by
V0(x) = I + E − T0 − (1 + t0)R0(x)− τx+G+
ALR0
ℓ0
(19)
for 0 ≤ x ≤ b. There are two groups of suburbanites living in a suburban jurisdiction: those
who work in the CBD and pay the land rent Rs0, and those who work in their SBD and pay
the land rent Rs. Using (2) and (8) shows that the utility of a consumer belonging to the first
group is
V s0 (x) = I + E − T0 − (1 + t)R
s
0(x)− τx+G+
ALR
ℓ
(20)
with b < x ≤ y∗, while using (3) and (8) implies that the utility of a consumer belonging to
the second group is
V s(x) = I − T − (1 + t)Rs(x)− τ |x− xs|+G+
ALR
ℓ
(21)
with y∗ < x ≤ B. Using the equilibrium conditions V0 = V
s
0 = V
s = V ∗, we are now equipped
to determine the value of r0 for the central city as well as the values of r
s
0 and r
s for the suburban
jurisdictions.
At x = B, the land rent equals the opportunity cost of land, which is zero. At x = y∗, the
land rent must be equal to 0 for V (y∗) = V (B) to hold. Indeed, if a consumer offers a positive
bid to reside at y∗, her utility is given by V (y∗) < V (B). The results in turn imply
rs =
τ (B − y∗)
2(1 + t)
which yields
Rs(x) =
τ (B − y∗)
2(1 + t)
−
τ
1 + t
|x− xs|.
Since Rs(y∗) = 0, repeating the above argument leads to
rs0 =
τ
1 + t
y∗
and thus
Rs0(x) =
τ
1 + t
(y∗ − x).
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Using the above two expressions for the land rents, we get the aggregate land rate in any
edge city:
ALR =
τ
1 + t

(y∗ − b)2
2
+
(B − y∗)2
4

(22)
which decreases with the property tax rate t.
Using the equilibrium condition V0(b) = V
s
0 (b) and (4), we get
r0 =
1
1 + t0

τ (y∗ − b) +
ALR0
ℓ0
−
ALR
ℓ

(23)
which shows that the central city land rent capitalizes the differences in congestion costs and in
the aggregate land rent redistributed across local residents. For any given value of t0, whence
of r0, we have
R0(x) = r0 −
τ
1 + t0
x.
Consequently,
ALR0 = m
b	
0
R0(x)dx =
ℓ0
t0

τ

y∗ −
b
2

−
ALR
ℓ

(24)
which also decreases with the property tax set in the central city. Plugging this expression in
(23) shows that r0 depends on the two property tax rates, whereas r
i
i and r
0
i are independent
of t0.
Figure 2 provides a side view of the land rent profile. It shows that the land rent is not
continuous at the boundary b because consumers just inside and outside that boundary face
different property taxes and live in jurisdictions with different costs per capita for the public
services and different aggregate land rent per capita. The above expressions show that the land
rent profile varies with the economic boundary of the central city.
Figure 2 about here
Furthermore, the equilibrium land rents R0 (x), R
s
0 (x) and R
s (x) fully capitalize the prop-
erty tax levied by the jurisdiction containing the location x. Hence, when the local tax increases,
the land rent is shifted downward. Note, however, that while Rs (x) and Rs0 (x) do not depend
on the central city property tax, the tax policy of the suburban jurisdictions generates a tax
externality capitalized in the land rent paid in the central city. Indeed, (4) and (24) imply
that R0 (x) rises with t. Moreover, our framework allows determining the costs and benefits
that are capitalized and where the capitalization arises (Starrett, 1981). There is “external
capitalization” in the central city because workers move from the suburban jurisdictions to the
CBD.
Before proceeding, note also that the full price of land in the central city, defined by (1 +
t0)R0 (x), decreases (increases) with t0 (t) through a pure land capitalization effect of the
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property tax rates captured by r0. By contrast, the full price of land (1+t)R
s(x) and (1+t)Rs0(x)
that prevail in the suburban jurisdictions are independent of the property tax. This property
crucially depends on the assumption of symmetric suburban jurisdictions.
4.2 Tax competition between the central and suburban jurisdictions
Business and property taxes allow each local government to finance the local public good
provided to its residents. Hence, the budget constraint of jurisdiction i = 0, 1, ...,m is given by
F + c
ℓ2i
2
= TiθiL+ tiALRi
where Ti is the business tax and ti the property tax levied in jurisdiction i. One appealing
feature of our tax game is that we may determine the business tax rates independently of the
property tax rates.
4.2.1 Business tax
Local governments set non-cooperatively their business tax rates with the aim of maximizing
the welfare of their residents. Specifically, the central city maximizes W0 with respect to T0,
while every suburban jurisdiction maximizes W with respect to T . Since firms choose their
locations in the third stage, governments anticipate the consequences of their choices on the
size of their business districts. Depending on the impact of tax competition on firms’ locations,
two cases may arise: θ∗ > 0 (θ∗0 < 1) and θ
∗ = 0 (θ∗0 = 1).
The polycentric metropolitan area At the tax competition stage, the welfare in the
central city is given by
W0 = m
b
0
V (x)dx = ℓ0(I + E − T0 +G)− t0ALR0 − τ
mb2
2
(25)
where we have used (19). Substituting the budget constraint F + cℓ20/2 = T0θ0L+ t0ALR0 and
the labor market balance condition θ0L = ℓ0 +m(y
∗ − b) into (25), we obtain
W0 = ℓ0 (I +G+ E) +mT0(y
∗ − b)− F − c
ℓ20
2
− τ
mb2
2
(26)
where ℓ0 = mb.
The novelty here is that raising the business tax T0 gives rise to two opposing effects. First,
through the lower wage paid to the CBD workers (see (8)) a higher business tax generates tax
exporting because a fraction of the CBD workers lives outside the central city (y∗ > b).5 A
5See Wildasin and Wilson (1998) for a discussion on tax competition with tax exporting.
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higher business tax also induces a few suburban workers to shift to their respective SBD, which
means that the extent of tax exporting (y∗ − b) shrinks with T0. In other words, a rise in T0
yields a smaller CBD, that is, a smaller fiscal basis. The equilibrium corporate tax in the central
city is the outcome to this trade-off. Note that a marginal increase in T0 has no impact on the
commuting costs within its jurisdiction because all the residents work in the CBD. However,
by reducing the number of CBD firms, it affects the commuting costs paid by the suburban
consumers, an effect not internalized by the central city government.
A suburban jurisdiction involves two types of workers, those who work in the CBD and
those who work in their own SBD. Using (20) and (21) as well as the budget constraint F+
cℓ2/2 = TθL+ tALR where θL = B − y∗, the total welfare in a suburban jurisdiction is given
by
W = (y∗ − b)(I +G+ E − T0) + (B − y
∗)(I +G− T ) + T (B − y∗)−G
−


y∗
b
τxdx+
B
y∗
τ |x− xs|dx

− F − c
ℓ2
2
. (27)
Note that the total commuting costs borne by the residents of an edge city are given by
y∗
b
τxdx+
B
y∗
τ |x− xs|dx = τ

(y∗)2 − b2
2
+
(B − y∗)2
4

.
A marginal decrease in T raises the share of jobs in the SBD, and thus reduces commuting
costs within the ith edge city. In addition, a smaller number of firms in the CBD decreases the
productive efficiency of the MA. A suburban government takes into account the efficiency loss
occurring within its sole jurisdiction through the lower wage paid to some of its residents. In
sum, unlike the central city government, a suburban government cares about the trade-off be-
tween commuting costs and agglomeration economies, but it does so within its own jurisdiction
only.
Differentiating W0 (W ) with respect to T0 (T ) yields:
dW0
dT0
= m

(y∗ − b)−
2T0
3τ

(28)
and
dW
dT
= −
2T
3τ
(29)
where d2W0/dT
2
0 < 0 and d
2W/dT 2 < 0 hold. Using (29), we obtain
T ∗ = 0. (30)
In other words, the suburban governments neither tax nor subsidize firms. Plugging (30)
into (28) and solving for T0, we get the equilibrium business tax set in the central city:
T ∗0 =
E
2
+
τ (B − 3b)
4
. (31)
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Hence, the business tax set by the central city rises with the intensity of agglomeration
economies because more firms want to benefit from a central location. Similarly, lowering
commuting costs leads to a smaller business tax rate because the location of jobs is more
sensitive to a change in the spatial difference in business tax rates when commuting costs lower
(the elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate increases when τ falls).
Observe that T ∗0 decreases with b. Indeed, when b increases, (17) implies that y
∗ remains the
same when T0 and T are given. Hence, the extent of tax exporting y
∗ − b shrinks. This incen-
tivizes the central city government to lower its tax rate to expand its fiscal basis. Furthermore,
B = L/m decreases with the number of suburban jurisdictions, and thus the equilibrium tax
rate increases. As in Hoyt (1991), but in a different context, reducing the number of suburban
jurisdictions softens tax competition and allows the central city to set a higher business tax.
Note that, at the tax rates (31) and (35), the economic boundary of the central city is given
by
y∗ =
B
6
+
E
3τ
+
b
2
. (32)
This expression shows how τ and E interact to determine the economic boundary of the
central city through the ratio E/τ : the lower commuting costs or the stronger agglomeration
economies, the larger number of suburbanites working in the CBD. This cross-border commut-
ing flow highlights how the suburban areas benefit from the productivity gains generated by
the concentration of firms in the central city (Haughwout and Inman, 2009). Furthermore, since
the business tax rate decreases with b, the CBD becoming more fiscally attractive, and thus
the economic size of the central city also rises with b.
It remains to check that b < y∗ < B. The condition y∗ < B holds if and only if
b < bˆ ≡
5B
3
−
2E
3τ
. (33)
For the MA to be polycentric, bˆ must be positive and smaller than B. The former holds
if and only if E < 5τB/2, while the latter amounts to E < τB, which is the more stringent
condition. Using E < τB shows that the central city business tax (31) is always positive.
Summing up, jobs are decentralized at the tax competition outcome when at least one of the
following conditions is satisfied: (i) the MA population is large, (ii) commuting costs are high,
and (iii) agglomeration economies are not too large.
Furthermore, y∗ > b if and only if
b < b˜ ≡
B
3
+
2E
3τ
(34)
which means that the central city population cannot be too large for the CBD to attract
suburbanite workers. When b ≥ b˜, we show in Appendix that y∗ = b. In other words, the
economic limit of the central city is never smaller than its administrative limit.
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The next proposition summarizes our results.
Proposition 2 The central city government always sets a higher business tax than the suburban
governments.
Note that the above result holds true when E = 0. Thus, the positive tax differential
reflects two types of asymmetries: the first one is due to the central position of the CBD in the
transportation network, while the other stems from the presence of agglomeration economies at
the CBD. In particular, the tax differential widens when agglomeration economies in the central
city get stronger. The intuition behind this finding is clear. As noted by Baldwin and Krugman
(2004), a locale with a comparative advantage can set a higher corporate tax rate because more
firms want to locate there. This implies a larger number of cross-border commuters, and thus
a broader extent of tax exporting.6
How does the wage differential between CBD- and SBD-workers vary with the population
size? Imagine a flow of in-migrants who occupy the suburban areas, thus implying urban sprawl
through an increase in B. It then follows from (31) and (30) that the tax rate in the central city
rises whereas the tax rate set by the suburban jurisdictions remains equal to 0. As a consequence,
w∗0 decreases while w
∗ = I. This in turn implies that the wage differential w∗0 − w
∗ = 3τ (y∗ −
B/3)/2 shrinks when L increases. The wage gap is positive if and only if L < 3bm + 2Em/τ .
When this inequality does not hold, the SBD-workers earn a higher wage than the CBD-workers.
Despite its comparative advantage in terms of accessibility and the existence of agglomeration
economies, wages in the central city fall below those paid in the edge cities. Yet, a fraction
of suburbanites still choose to work in the central city, the reason being that the suburban
jurisdictions become so large that, for the workers close to the boundary b, commuting to the
SBD is more expensive than commuting the CBD.
The reversal of fortune between the CBD and the SBDs is the reflection of the insufficient
exploitation of the agglomeration economies in the central city whose relative size in the MA
becomes smaller. For the MA to better exploit the productivity gains associated with the
concentration of firms, the administrative boundary of the central city must be increased. This
shows once more how the boundary of the central city may affect the efficiency of the MA and
the welfare of its inhabitants, especially in a context of rapid urban growth.
Note, however, that the disadvantage of being a small central city may be overcome if
commuting costs are sufficiently low. In this case, more jobs are created in the CBD, which
allows a better exploitation of agglomeration economies while the central city government sets
a lower business tax.
6Jofre-Monseny (2013) and Koh et al. (2013) find, respectively, that higher agglomeration economies increase
business tax rates in Spanish and German municipalities.
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The monocentric metropolitan area When (33) does not hold, all jobs are concentrated
in the CBD and the urban labor market is integrated. In other words, when agglomeration
economies are sufficiently strong, we fall back on the standard monocentric city model of urban
economics (Fujita, 1989; Zenou, 2009). The corresponding equilibrium tax paid by the CBD
firms is obtained by replacing b with bˆ into (31), that is, the value of b that satisfies y∗ = B or,
equivalently, θ = 0:
T ∗0 =
E
2
+
τ(B − 3bˆ)
4
= E − τB. (35)
This expression is always nonnegative because E < τB would imply bˆ > B.
Note that the tax rate T ∗0 decreases with b as long as b < bˆ and becomes flat and equal
to (35) when b exceed bˆ. In this event, agglomeration economies are sufficiently strong for the
central city government to choose a tax rate that blockades the emergence of SBDs. Note (35)
is the highest rate that satisfies this property. In other words, the central city behaves as if it
were a monopolist that sets the limit-price to deter the entry of competitors.
When the MA is monocentric, a deeper institutional fragmentation raises the corporate
tax set in the central city. Indeed, since there are no SBDs, the central city government has
no incentive to reduce its tax rate when the degree of fragmentation increases. Because its
population raises with m, the central city government can shift the cost of the public good
toward firms without affecting the attractiveness of the CBD.
4.2.2 Property tax
It remains to determine the equilibrium property taxes, which is residual because F + cℓ2i /2
is exogenous. Since T ∗ = 0, the property tax revenue of a suburban jurisdiction is equal to
the public good cost: t∗ALR = G. Using this expression and (22), we obtain the equilibrium
property tax given by
t∗ =
 F + cℓ2/2
τ

(y∗−b)2
2
+ (B−y
∗)2
4

− (F + cℓ2/2)
 . (36)
In suburban jurisdictions, the property tax may increase or decrease with the administrative
boundary b. Indeed, whereas t∗ may increase with b because the fiscal basis of a suburban juris-
diction shrinks, the opposite effect may arise because, the jurisdiction becoming less populated,
the public services are less costly to provide. Obviously, the latter effect dominates when c is
high enough. For the same reason, a larger number of suburban jurisdictions has an ambiguous
effect on the property tax. The central city economic boundary also influences the property tax
rate t∗. In particular, an increase in y∗ may generate a tax drop. Indeed, dt∗/dy∗ < 0 if and
only y∗ > (2b + B)/3 or, equivalently, E/τ > (B + b) /2. In other words, an expansion of the
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central city economic boundary allows the suburban governments to decrease their property
tax if and and only if commuting costs are low, agglomeration economies are strong, or both.
As for the central city, its budget constraint implies that the equilibrium property tax
satisfies the relationship:
t∗0 =
F + cℓ20/2− T
∗
0my
∗
ALR0
where ALR0 depends on t
∗
0. There is no need to solve this equation, however. Indeed, once
T ∗0my
∗is determined, the value of t0ALR0 is constant regardless of the value of t0 (see (24)).
Put differently, once the business tax is chosen, the budget constraint is satisfied through the
adjustment of the land tax base ALR0 only. Thus, there is a continuum of property tax
equilibria. Note, however, that the actual value of t0 has no impact on the common utility level
in the MA, so that any equilibrium value may be chosen.
4.3 Is the CBD too large or too small?
Comparing (11) and (17) reveals that the CBD reaches its first-best size if and only if T0 = T ,
whereas tax competition yields a positive tax differential equal to T ∗0 . In accordance with the
literature, we thus find that business tax competition delivers an inefficient outcome. This
takes here the concrete form of too small a CBD since
y∗ − b =
1
2
(y¯ − b) .
Furthermore, (17) implies that y∗ = y¯ regardless of the common business tax rate T¯ . In this
case, the central city would lean a high business rate because the tax exporting effect T¯m(y¯−b)
increases linearly with T¯ . It then follows from (26) that consumers in the central city are better
off when T¯ is larger. Conversely, because (27) decreases with T¯ , residents in the suburban
jurisdictions are worse off. As a consequence, the central city and the edge cities have opposing
interests, thus highlighting the difficulty for the jurisdictions to agree on a common tax rate.
As shown in subsection 5.2, the desirability of tax harmonization critically depends on our
modelling strategy of agglomeration economies. What is robust for enhancing the productive
efficiency of the MA is the need to coordinate business tax policies.
Observe that the productive efficiency loss generated by the misallocation of capital de-
creases when the central city population raises. Indeed, when b increases the central city
chooses to set a lower business tax because the fraction of workers residing outside its limit
decreases (the extent of tax exporting shrinks). The administrative boundary at which the
misallocation of capital vanishes under tax competition is given by the solution to y∗(b) = y,
where y is the optimal economic boundary of the central city. Therefore, a planner seeking
the efficient allocation of capital under tax competition chooses the administrative boundary
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b = b˜, which exceeds the optimal boundary b. In this event, there is no cross-border commuting,
hence no tax exporting, which is precisely the source for the misallocation of capital. In doing
so, the planner does not deliver the social outcome (b˜ > b). Indeed, the central city is too large,
whereas the suburban jurisdictions are too small. This results in a suboptimal distribution
of people across jurisdictions. Conversely, choosing b for the administrative boundary of the
central city leads to an insufficient concentration of jobs in the CBD (y∗(b) < y). In sum, under
corporate tax competition, when the population size of the central city is optimal, the CBD is
too small, whereas the central city is too large when the size of the CBD is optimal.
Last, like in standard oligopoly theory, a larger number of suburban jurisdictions exacerbates
competition. This incentivizes the central city government to decrease its tax rate, thus reducing
the misallocation of capital.
To summarize,
Proposition 3 In a polycentric metropolitan area, corporate tax competition yields insufficient
concentration of jobs and firms in the CBD. Furthermore, the productive efficiency loss decreases
when the relative population size of the central city increases and/or the number of suburban
jurisdictions rises.
Note that higher agglomeration economies, lower commuting costs, or both raise the global
productive efficiency of the MA, mEy∗, because the CBD attracts more firms. However, the
relative productive efficiency loss, mE(y¯ − y∗), also increases when agglomeration economies
are higher and/or commuting costs lower. This is because the planner internalizes the whole
benefits generated by these two effects, whereas the local governments do not. To be precise,
the fiscal externality generated by the central city government onto the suburban jurisdictions
is given by
m
dW
dT0

T0=T∗0
= −m(y∗ − b)
which is proportional to the extent of tax exporting (y∗−b), while its magnitude increases with
E and decreases with τ . Therefore, we have:
Proposition 4 Tax competition prevents public policies that aim to enhance the global produc-
tivity of the MA to deliver their full potential impact.
4.4 Does redrawing the central city limit remedy the misallocation
of jobs?
We now consider a second-best approach in which the planner chooses the central city admin-
istrative boundary or the number of suburban jurisdictions, which maximizes the total welfare
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within the MA, prior to the game described above. In other words, the planner first chooses the
welfare-maximizing value of b, or m, and then lets consumers, firms and local governments to
pursue their own interest. It is readily verified that, when the MA is monocentric, the first-best
and second-best approaches yield the same city size and the same degree of fragmentation.
Therefore, from now on we focus on the case of a polycentric MA.
The administrative limit of the central city maximizing total welfare when T0 and T are
given by the equilibrium tax rates is given by
b∗ =
2E +B (8c + τ)
3τ + 8c (m+ 1)
where y∗ (b∗) > b∗ > b for m ≥ 2 and B > b∗ as long as B > y∗. Hence, as in the first-best
solution, the welfare-maximizing boundary under tax competition involves institutional frag-
mentation and a decentralized supply of public services. However, unlike the first-best solution,
suburban jurisdictions are always smaller than the central city. Because tax competition favors
the edge cities at the expense of the central city, the second-best approach aims to reduce this
distortion by fostering a bigger central city.
The planner may also determine the degree of fragmentation of the MA m∗ maximizing the
total welfare W sT =W0 +mW . It is implicitly given by the equilibrium condition:
∂W sT
∂m
= −F +
E
4
E + bτ
τ
+
3τ
16

L
m
2
− b2

+
c
2

L
m
2
− b2 (2m+ 1)

= 0 (37)
with ∂2W sT/∂m
2 < 0. As in the first-best analysis, for a given administrative border b, m∗
increases with the population size (L), the intensity of agglomeration economies (E) and the
cost parameter capturing the crowding effect of public services (c), while it decreases with
investment outlays (F ). However, tax competition incentivizes the planner to establish a more
fragmented MA than in the first-best configuration. Indeed, the optimality condition (37)
evaluated at b = b and m = m implies that
∂W sT
∂m

m=m,b=b
=
3τ
16

L
3m
2
−

b−
2E
3τ
2
which is positive for all m ≥ 2. Therefore, the planner raises the number of edge cities, that
is, reduces their population size, to alleviate the efficiency loss associated with the insufficient
concentration of firms in the CBD.
To sum up,
Proposition 5 Assume a polycentric metropolitan area in which the planner chooses the limit
of the central city or the number of jurisdictions. Then, the welfare-maximizing boundary is
such that the metropolitan area is formed by several jurisdictions, while there is commuting
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from the suburban jurisdictions to the central city. Furthermore, the second-best central city is
bigger than the first-best central city.
Equally important, the planner can improve the efficiency of the distribution of firms by
investing in transport infrastructure within the whole MA. Indeed, lowering commuting costs
entices the central city government to decrease its business tax rate. This in turn leads more
firms to set up in the CBD, which reduces the productivity losses generated by institutional
fragmentation and tax competition. In this case, the need of redrawing the boundaries of the
central city is less stringent.
5 Spillovers
A large MA is replete with external effects of different types. The usual suspects are the con-
sumption by suburbanites working in the CBD of public services provided by the central city
and the presence of agglomeration economies and spillovers between firms. In this section, we
discuss what our main findings become in each of these two cases. As in the foregoing, we
first consider the optimal outcome, and then characterize the equilibrium generated by tax
competition.
5.1 Public good spillovers
So far, we have neglected the possibility for the suburbanites working in the CBD to consume
the public services provided in the central city. Instead, we now assume that in-commuters
cannot be excluded from the consumption of these services. In this case, suburbanites working
in the CBD benefit from both the public services provided in their own jurisdiction and in the
central city. These consumers, enjoy a utility level equal to 2G from consuming all the public
services.
5.1.1 The optimal metropolitan area
That suburbanites consume the public services supplied in the central city is known to be a
major source of distortion in the allocation of public resources within a MA. In presence of
such spillovers, the analysis of Section 3 is no longer valid. This is because the planner faces an
additional trade-off: on the one hand, the suburbanites’ enjoy an additional utility gain given
by m (y − b)G; on the other hand, the cost of the public services provided by the central city
rises by an amount equal to c (my)2 /2− c (mb)2 /2. If the total utility change is negative, that
is, G − cm (b+ y) /2 < 0, the analysis of Section 3 holds true because consuming the public
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services supplied in the central city makes the suburbanites worse-off. On the contrary, when
G > cm (b+ y) /2, the social welfare function becomes
WT = mBG+m (y − b)G+myE −
mτ
2
y2 −mτ

B − y
2
2
−
c
2
(my)2 −
cm
2
(B − b)2 − (m+ 1)F. (38)
Solving the first-order conditions for welfare maximization (38) with respect to b and y
yields
b¯
sp
= B −
G
c
< B y¯
sp
=
2G+ 2E +Bτ
3τ + 2cm
(39)
where b¯
sp
> 0 if and only if cB exceeds G; otherwise, b¯
sp
= 0.
The question we address here is to figure out how public good spillovers affect the optimal
organization of the MA. One solution consists in comparing y¯
sp
with y¯ and b¯
sp
with b¯. The
expression (39) shows that the central city population size shrinks whereas its economic size
expands with G. More precisely, when the condition G > cm

b¯sp + y¯sp

/2 holds, we always
have b¯sp < b¯ while y¯sp > y¯ if and only if
G > cm

E
3τ
+
B
3

. (40)
When (40) holds, the presence of public good spillovers leads the planner to choose a smaller
central city but a larger CBD, the reason being that the value of m (y − b)G in (38) is high.
In this case, the discrepancy between the two central city limits b¯
sp
and y¯
sp
gets wider. More
generally, it is readily verified that y¯sp − b¯sp > 0 when G > cm

b¯sp + y¯sp

/2 holds. In sum,
when the utility of the public services is sufficiently large, their cross-border consumption is
always socially desirable.
5.1.2 The decentralized outcome
In the presence of public good spillovers, the indirect utility of a consumer living and working
in suburban city remains unchanged, but the indirect utility of a suburbanite working in the
central city is now given by v0i (x) ≡ V
0
i (x) + G. Equalizing these indirect utilities yields the
equilibrium economic boundary of the central city:
y
sp
(T0, T ) =
B
3
+
2[E +G− (T0 − T )]
3τ
which increases with G because the central city becomes more attractive to the suburbanites.
The objective function of the central city government is given by
W
sp
0 =W0(y
sp
)− c(my
sp
)2/2 + cℓ20/2
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while the suburban governments maximize
W sp = W (ysp) + (ysp − b)G.
The first order conditions are now given by
dW
sp
0
dT0
= m

y
sp
− b

−
2T0
3τ
+
2cm
3τ

and
dW
sp
dT
= −
2T
3τ
which implies
T
sp
0 = G−
3τG
2(3τ + cm)
−
9bτ 2
4(3τ + cm)
+
(3τ + 2cm)(Bτ + 2E)
4(3τ + cm)
(41)
while T sp = T ∗ = 0. Standard calculations reveal that dW
sp
0 /dT0 > 0 when T0 = T
∗
0 . As a
result, the business tax set by the central city is higher in the presence than in the absence of
public good spillovers. The reason is easy to grasp. More workers lure the CBD because they
can enjoy the public services provided by the central city. This entices more firms to set up
there. The extent of tax exporting thus increases, whereas the provision cost of public services
is higher. Both effects lead the central city to increase its business tax. In the suburban
jurisdictions, the effects are opposite. On the one hand, fewer firms locate in a SBD, so that
the corresponding local government collect less income from firms. On the other, a share of the
residents enjoy the consumption of more public services. The two effects cancel each other, so
that the tax rate set by the suburban jurisdictions does not change.
The existence of public good spillovers has both expected and unexpected redistributional
implications for consumers living in the central and peripheral jurisdictions. First, the out-
commuting suburbanites benefit from more public services whereas the central city residents
bear a higher provision cost for the public good. However, since the business tax paid by the
CBD firms is higher (T
sp
0 > T
∗
0 ), the central city workers get a lower pay. In contrast, the
SBD workers earn the same wage because T
sp
= T ∗ = 0. As a consequence, the central city
residents are hurt twice through an externality effect and an income effect. Therefore, the free-
riding problem between the central city and the suburban jurisdictions has implications that go
beyond the standard consumption effects generated by spillovers. This makes the cooperation
between the central and edge cities even more compelling for the MA to be efficient.
The central city economic boundary is now such that
y
sp
− y
sp
=
3τ + cm
3τ

y
sp
− b

Hence, when public good spillovers occur (y
sp
− b > 0), we have y¯
sp
> y
sp
. There is again
insufficient concentration of firms and jobs in the CBD. However, it is not clear whether the
presence of spillovers exacerbates the misallocation of jobs within the MA. Indeed, although the
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higher business tax set by the central city deters firms to locate in the CBD, the consumption
of the central city public services by suburbanites tends to generate more jobs in the CBD.
The ultimate impact depends on the parameter values. In addition, the discrepancy between
y¯
sp
and y
sp
increases with G since G−T
sp
0 and, in turn y
sp
, increases with G. Thus Proposition
3 holds true in the presence of public good spillovers.
Proposition 5 comprises a summary.
Proposition 6 Assume that the suburbanites working in the CBD consume the central city
public services. Then, the tax differential between the central city government and the suburban
governments raises and the size of CBD remains too small.
5.1.3 The central city as a bigger supplier of public services
The central city often supplies a broader range of public services than the suburban jurisdictions.
It is, therefore, legitimate to ask what the above findings become in such a context. To show
it, we assume that the central city provides a public good of size βG. Alternatively, if G is a
CES-bundle of differentiated public services, βG represents a range of more differentiated and
specialized services.
The optimal population size of the central city increases because of the higher utility stem-
ming from the consumption of the public services:
b¯β = b¯+
β (G− 1)
c (m+ 1)
> b¯
which need not be smaller than B. As a result, the institutional structure of the MA now
depends on the relative provision of public services between the central city and the suburban
jurisdictions, i.e. β. The optimal size of the central city increases with the range of public
services it provides, whereas the suburban jurisdictions shrink. In the limit, the planner chooses
to have a single jurisdiction only if (β − 1)G/cm > B, a condition that is unlikely to hold in a
large MA.
Supplying a wider range of public services in the central city does not affect its optimal
economic boundary as long as the suburbanites do not consume these services. Thus, the
optimal MA may be institutionally fragmented while having an integrated labor market or
may involve a single jurisdiction together with several employment centers. Moreover, since
the business tax competition process does not depend on G, the asymmetry in the provision
of public services has no impact on the jurisdictions’ business taxes, and thus Proposition 3
holds true. In contrast, when suburbanites working in the CBD consume the central city public
services, the central city becomes even more attractive. In this case, the discrepancy between
the optimal administrative and economic boundaries is exacerbated. Indeed, the administrative
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limit in (39) is unaffected because the planner has no reason to differentiate across CBD-workers.
On the contrary, y¯sp increases with β because more consumers are able to enjoy the wider array
of public services provided by the central city. Furthermore, as shown by (41) in which G is
replaced with βG, the central city’s government increases its business tax. As a consequence,
the tax gap widens and Proposition 3 holds true.
5.2 Agglomeration economies and firm spillovers
As mentioned in subsection 2.3, treating E as a constant constitutes a crude approximation
of agglomeration economies. This assumption also neglects the existence of spillovers between
firms located in the CBD and the SBDs. Given the importance played by these effects in
the working of a MA, we find it important to study what our main findings become under
a more general specification allowing for spatial externalities whose intensity varies with the
distribution of firms within the MA. Specifically, we consider a specification based on Baldwin
et al., (2005) and Rosenthal and Strange (2004), which takes into account both the number of
firms within each center and the existence of spillovers between centers.
Let n = L be the total number of firms. When a firm is located in the CBD, its profits
become Π0 = I − (w0 −E0)− T0 where
E0 = n0 + λ(n− n0) (42)
stands for the productivity gain associated with a central location. In this expression, E0
increases with the number n0 of firms located in the central city, whereas λ ∈ (0, 1) measures
the intensity of the spillovers between the CBD and each SBD. Hence, the benefit of being
located in the CBD rises with the number of firms that locate therein as well as with the
intensity of the spillovers generated by the SBDs. When a firm sets up in the ith edge city, its
profit function is Πi = I − (wi − Ei)− Ti with
Ei = ni + λn0 (43)
where ni is the number of firms located in the ith SBD. Hence, an edge city benefits from inter-
actions with the central city only, whereas the central city benefits from nonmarket interactions
with all edge cities. In the symmetric case (ni = (n− n0)/m), E0 exceeds Ei when
n0
n− n0
>
1/m− λ
1− λ
which always holds when λ ≥ 1/m. In other words, the CBD has a comparative advantage
when λ is sufficiently large. The assumption used in the foregoing sections may be viewed as
a limiting case of (42) in which the CBD firms benefit from the entire range of agglomeration
economies generated within the MA, whereas the SBD firms do not benefit from agglomeration
economies.
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5.2.1 The optimal metropolitan area
Using (42) and (43) shows that the sum of productivity gains associated with a given distrib-
ution of firms is equal to PE = E0n0 +ΣiEini with
PE = my [my + λm (B − y)] +m (B − y) (B − y + λmy) .
It is then readily verified that maximizing productivity gains within the MA fosters a mono-
centric configuration (B = y). This is a reflection of the comparative advantage of the CBD,
which unlike the SBDs interacts with each SBD. However, this argument disregards the so-
cial costs generated by workers’ commuting flows. The social welfare function (9) becomes
W = PE − CC − PC.
The central city supply area is still given by the array delineated by b¯, whereas the optimal
location of the marginal worker now depends on the intensity of spillovers among firms. When
λ < λˆ ≡
1
2
m+ 1
m
−
3τ
8m
(44)
the social welfare function is increasing or convex over the interval [b¯, B]. In this event, the
optimal boundary is given by y¯ = B. When the spillovers between the CBD and the SBDs are
weak, the social optimum involves the agglomeration of firms in the CBD, for otherwise the
productive efficiency losses would be too high.
If λ > λˆ holds, then the optimal location of the marginal workers becomes
y¯a =
B [τ + 4(λm− 1)]
3τ − 4(m+ 1) + 8λm
∈ (b¯, B)
as in Section 3. Put differently, when spillovers between the CBD and SBDs are strong enough,
the planner chooses to reduce total commuting costs by decentralizing jobs.
In sum, for the optimal MA to be polycentric, it must be that λ > λˆ. This is consistent
with what we saw in subsection 3.1 where E cannot be too large for the MA to have SBDs.
5.2.2 The decentralized outcome
It is readily verified that the worker indifferent between working in the CBD or in a SBD is
located at
ya(T0, T ) =
B[τ + 2 (λm− 1)]− 2 (T0 − T )
3τ − 2(m+ 1) + 4λm
(45)
which varies with the tax differential T0 − T as in (17). Rewriting the social welfare functions
(25) and (27) using ya(T0, T ), we obtain
dW0
dT0
= m(ya − b) +mT0
dya
dT0
+m(1− λ)
dya
dT0
.
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Since the absolute value of dya/dT0 decreases with λ, the third term in the right-hand
side of this expression decreases with λ, and thus the impact of the first two terms becomes
predominant when λ is sufficiently large.
Regarding the suburban jurisdictions, the tax incentives are more complex because the
welfare of a CBD-worker residing in a suburban jurisdiction is affected by the CBD-externality,
whereas the welfare of a SBD-worker is affected by the SBD-externality.
Solving the tax game and plugging the equilibrium rates in (45), we get the following
equilibrium value for the central city economic boundary:
ya − b = (1− Λ) (y¯a − b) with Λ ≡
3τ − 2(m+ 1) + 4λm
6 [τ − (m+ 1) + 2λm]
.
As in Section 4, tax competition distorts the allocation of jobs and firms’ locations within
the MA. Since 0 < Λ < 1 when λ satisfies the condition (44), it is easy to show that b < ya < y¯a.
In addition, as in subsection 3.3, the CBD size is too small when the population size of the
central city is optimal (ya

b¯

< y¯a), while the population size of the central city for which the
CBD reaches its optimal size (b¯a solves ya (b) = y¯a) exceeds its optimal size (b¯a > b¯).
The following proposition is a summary.
Proposition 7 Assume a polycentric metropolitan area. If agglomeration economies depend
on the location of firms, corporate tax competition yields too small a CBD. Furthermore, when
the population size of the central city is optimal, the CBD is too small, whereas the central city
is too large when the size of the CBD is optimal.
Thus, we obtain results similar to those presented in subsection 3.3. Since Proposition 3 is
central for our analysis and results, we find it reasonable to say that they are not driven by the
assumption of exogenous agglomeration economies. In other words, our findings will be remain
qualitatively the same under (42)-(43).
6 Concluding Remarks
Metropolitan areas are non-legal entities that play a key role in the economic development of
emerging and developed countries alike. This probably explains why political scientists have
long been interested in issues related to metropolitan governance. The earliest approach that
we are aware of - the regionalism approach that continues to shape the political debates - views
the multiplicity of political jurisdictions as inherently inefficient. Political fragmentation would
limit the ability to deal with area-wide urban problems that transcend local jurisdictions. The
prescription is then to promote metropolitan governments and a better correspondence between
administrative and functional or economic areas. In contrast to this view, the public choice
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approach, based on Tiebout (1956) and Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961), does not see
systematic inefficiency in the polycentric political organization of a MA. Similar to market
economies where firms compete to offer the best good at the best price, political fragmentation
would allow residents to select the jurisdiction that offers them the best package.
Our general equilibrium model delivers a clear-cut message that strongly suggests an in-
termediate approach. Indeed, both the first-best and second-best solutions involve the decen-
tralization of public services within the MA as well as an economic limit of the central city
that encompasses its administrative boundary. In addition, redrawing the boundary between
the central and suburban jurisdictions does not allow reaching the first best, but such a pol-
icy may damper the inefficient allocation of firms and jobs across employment centers. This
points to the need for multifunctional governance: “small” things should be managed by local
jurisdictions, and “big” things by a metropolitan government. Labor and transport issues in
particular should be handled at the metropolitan level. Although derived from a simple model,
these conclusions are sufficient to show that policy recommendations based on the regionalism
and public choice approaches are unwarranted.
Although we recognize that political fragmentation is not bad per se, the tax competition
process leads to an inefficient distribution of firms and jobs. This leads us to formulate some
policy recommendations in the spirit of what is known as “New Regionalism” (Savitch and
Vogel, 2000) - mixing a polycentric political system with inter-municipal cooperation to solve
mutual problems. In a nutshell, several of our recommendations concur with the principle of
subsidiarity. Our analysis also shows that some policies must be conducted at the level of the
MA as a whole. For example, an integrated transportation policy that aims to lower commuting
costs will increase the overall productivity of the MA. Simultaneously, it will also increase
the efficiency loss generated by tax competition. In this respect, our results give credence to
the large transportation projects that are being developed in Greater London (Crossrail) and
Greater Paris (Grand Paris Express), but it suggests supplementing these projects with other
instruments to magnify their positive impact.
Our framework can also serve to address more controversial issues in local public finance
and transportation economics. According to Inman (2009), rethinking the governance of the
MAs through Business Improvement Districts (BIDs) and Neighborhood Improvement Districts
could be a way to improve the fiscal performance of a large MA. BIDs are business associations
and can be considered self-financing private governments that offer supplemental services to
their members. By restoring market-driven incentives in location choices, the development of
BIDs within the central city would make it more attractive, thus strengthening agglomeration
economies. Helsley and Strange (1998) analyze such organizations and show that their welfare
effects on consumers are ambiguous and complex. However, their analysis should be extended
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to the case of a genuine urban framework with the aim of determining the impact of private
governments on the spatial distribution of firms and consumers.
Our analysis supports what seems to be the minimal set of requirements needed to promote
more efficient MAs. Yet, it is fair to say that our findings have been obtained under several
simplifying assumptions; thus care is needed in interpreting them. First, we did not address
competition in public goods, an issue that is notoriously difficult, especially because many
models are plagued with the non-existence of a Nash equilibrium. In this respect, it is worth
noting that our model may be interpreted as one in which jurisdictions avoid the damaging
effects of a race to the bottom by coordinating their supply of public services. Therefore, even
in the absence of such distortions, our analysis has unveiled new sources of market failure.
Moreover, it is well known that one political and social difficulty encountered within a MA
stems from the heterogeneity of households that cluster in specific neighborhoods, which in
turn generates spatial discrimination across socioeconomic groups. This issue has been tackled
in the monocentric city model of urban economics but has not been explored in the context of
a polycentric MA. Lastly, we did not allow consumers to choose a variable lot size by trading
the homogeneous good against land. Several of our results remain valid when the population
density is not uniform anymore but the determination of the equilibrium land rent within each
jurisdiction is a more delicate issue.
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Appendix
Assume that y∗ ≤ b, which is equivalent to b ≥ b˜. In this event, (26) no longer describes the
total welfare in the central city, which is now given by the following expression:
W0 = (I + E − T0)my
∗ + (I − T )m(b− y∗) + T0my
∗
−mτ
(y∗)2
2
−mτ
b2 − (y∗)2
2
− F − c
ℓ20
2
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where y∗ is still given by (17). It is then readily verified that
dW0
dT0
= m(E + T )
dy∗
dT0
. (A.1)
Since y∗ decreases with T0, the above inequality implies that, for any given T , the central
city government chooses a business tax rate T ∗0 (T ) such that
y∗[T ∗0 (T ), T ] = b
always holds. In other words, the central city government chooses a business tax such that
the economic and administrative boundaries now coincide. This is because the central city is
sufficiently large (b ≥ b˜) to focus on its local population only.
As for the total welfare in a suburban jurisdiction, it becomes
W = (I − T )(B − b)−
τ
2

B + y∗
2
− b
2
−
τ
2

B −
B − y∗
2
2
− F − c
ℓ2
2
.
Differentiating W with respect to T yields the equilibrium condition:
dW
dT
= b− y∗ −
τ
2
(y∗ − b) + T
 dy∗
dT
= 0
with d2W/dT 2 < 0. Because b − y∗ = 0 must hold in equilibrium, the above equality implies
that T ∗ = 0 in (A.1). Plugging this value into (17) and solving for T0 yields
T ∗0 = E +
3τ
2

B
3
− b

.
In sum, the marginal worker is located outside the central city (b < y∗) or at the city border
(y∗ = b).
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Figure 1. The spatial pattern of the metropolitan area (m=8)  
 
 
Figure 2. Equilibrium Land Rent  
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